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There are few issues in which the gulf between the dogma of policy narratives and the 
evidence upon which they are purportedly based is as stark as that of how to address illicit 
drug economies. The challenges of researching illegal activities in highly insecure 
environments, the reliance upon drug control institutions for data and the highly politicised 
nature of debates surrounding drugs has often resulted in “policy-based evidence”, rather than 
evidence-based policy (Cramer and Goodhand 2011). Despite the vast sums of money that 
have been spent on establishing a global drug prohibition regime since President Nixon first 
launched the „War on Drugs‟ more than four decades ago, the international drug control 
regime is failing. Cultivation, production and consumption of illegal drugs have continued to 
rise and counter-narcotics strategies have had serious adverse impact on drug-producing 
countries.  
In spite of the failures of the international drug control regime, its fundamental tenets – 
prohibition, strict law enforcement and supply reduction – not only remain in place but have 
been justified by an increasingly sophisticated rationale. Alongside the continued emphasis 
upon the morality and social imperative of drug control, the prioritisation given to reducing 
production in source countries has been strengthened by two inter-related arguments which 
gained prominence in the 1990s: firstly that illicit drug economies have become embedded in 
the so-called „new wars‟ of the post-Cold War era; and secondly that drugs are therefore a 
clear indicator of political disorder and state fragility. In doing so, proponents of the drug 
control regime have sought to insulate the war on drugs from its critics by embedding 
counter-narcotics within broader foreign policy and development strategies focused on 
stabilisation, counter-insurgency, peacebuilding and state-building.     
Nowhere has this rationale been deployed more clearly than in Afghanistan. Tackling drug 
production became a central pillar of the west‟s state-building mission in Afghanistan and 
counter-insurgency efforts against the Taliban. However, despite the vast sums of money 
spent – the US is estimated to have spent $7.5 billion on counter-narcotics activities between 
2002 and 2014 (SIGAR 2014, 71) – the drawing down of the NATO mission in Afghanistan 
was greeted with unprecedented levels of opium poppy cultivation.  
Against this backdrop David Mansfield‟s book, A State built on Sand: How opium 
undermined Afghanistan, offers an invaluable analysis of the complex socio-economic and 
political dynamics surrounding the opium economy in Afghanistan in order to explain why 
counter-narcotics efforts have so often failed. In contrast to the „theatre of drugs policy‟ 
(p.10), in which many of those responsible for devising policy have never engaged with those 
that cultivate poppy, Mansfield‟s work is based on more than two decades of fieldwork 
amongst farming communities in Afghanistan as well as immersion in the drug policy 
community in Afghanistan. In the context of the sensitivities of conducting research on drugs 
in Afghanistan, and the challenging and deteriorating security situation in the country, the 
sheer depth and nuance of Mansfield‟s empirical research marks him out as the leading voice 
on the opium economy in Afghanistan. 
The overarching aim of the book is to analyse why opium bans have been implemented in 
Afghanistan, their differential impact on livelihoods and political (dis)order, and the effects 
of opium bans on broader state-building efforts. The book analyses four different opium bans 
implemented over a thirteen year period: The nationwide Taliban ban in 2000/1, two 
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successive bans implemented in Nangahar in 2004/5 and 2007/8, and the UK-led ban 
launched in Helmand between 2008 and 2013 as part of what became known as the Helmand 
Food Zone Program. By placing these bans at the centre of the complex interaction between 
externally-led counter-narcotics interventions, domestic political economy and local 
livelihoods, David Mansfield weaves a compelling narrative as to why opium bans endured in 
some areas but why, in the majority of cases, they had serious deleterious consequences by 
undermining rural livelihoods, destabilising fragile political structures and ultimately 
fostering protest, violence and rural rebellion. 
 
As Mansfield clearly shows, the opium bans launched in Afghanistan must be understood in 
the context of state-building efforts in the country. The Taliban ban launched in 2000/1 was a 
“political gamble” (p.135) aimed at improving relations with the west in order to secure 
development funding, an aspiration that was destroyed by 9/11. Attempts to ban opium 
became even more important after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan with levels of drug 
crop cultivation becoming a “litmus test for the overall state-building project” (p.139). Yet, as 
Mansfield compellingly argues, the assumption that counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency 
and state-building are necessarily complementary strategies is deeply problematic. The 
history of state-building in Afghanistan has been shaped on the one hand by perpetual power 
struggles between those at the political centre and alternative sources of authority in the rural 
periphery, and on the other by the state‟s weak economic base and reliance upon foreign 
patronage for survival (pp.101-2). Opium bans strike at the very heart of these tensions: “by 
failing to pursue a ban, the state risks a loss of legitimacy on the international stage, thereby 
jeopardising the funding that it so desperately needs for its political survival. However, by 
banning opium it also risks the opprobrium of the population at the periphery; a population 
that has proved to be adept at challenging the authority of the state and even deposing of the 
existing political order” (p.102).  
 
In this context, it has only been possible to implement opium bans following a constellation 
of international, national, provincial and local factors. In both Nangahar and Helmand the 
headline-grabbing escalation of opium production threatened to invalidate the state-building 
mission and increased the prioritisation given to counter-narcotics by international actors, 
while both the Karzai government in Kabul and provincial governors sought to 
instrumentalise opium bans as a means to secure international backing and to extract greater 
volumes of development assistance. Importantly, these efforts coincided with temporarily 
conducive conditions in rural areas. Rapid rises in the price of wheat increased fears over 
food security and encouraged farmers to shift from opium to food production to mitigate risk, 
while the heightened presence of foreign troops and Afghan National Security Forces 
increased the perception that the state had the capacity to impose a ban. Furthermore, the 
specific ways in which the bans were negotiated at the local level – through patronage of 
local elites, pledges of rural development assistance, efforts to persuade farmers not to grow 
opium rather than resort to coercion, and limited eradication early in the season which 
allowed farmers to use the same land to cultivate other crops – all enabled the 
operationalization of opium bans in the short-term.    
 
However, across much of Afghanistan bans proved unsustainable due to the centrality of 
opium to rural livelihoods. One of the greatest strengths of Mansfield‟s work is his critique of 
the way that neoclassical economics has been deployed to understand why farmers grow 
poppy. This approach has portrayed cultivators simplistically as rational utility maximisers, 
readily responsive to price signals, who grow opium poppy only because it is more profitable 
than other crops. In doing so it ignores the complex and multi-functional socio-economic, 
ecological and political roles that opium plays in rural economies. As a high value and 
heavily labour-intensive crop, poppy generates far greater demand for wage labour than other 
crops, ensuring the benefits of the opium economy extend beyond merely those farmers who 
cultivate it on their own land. These qualities have also facilitated local land markets by 
encouraging large landowners to lease land to sharecroppers (invariably the land poor) who 
then grow poppy in order to afford the land rental costs. These sharecropping agreements 
enable landless households to access land upon which they are then able to grow food crops 
alongside opium poppy, thus providing an insurance mechanism against food insecurity.  
 
Opium is also one of the only crops for which farmers are able to secure advance payments, 
thus making opium central to local credit systems that help to mitigate against sudden shocks, 
such as rising food prices or family illness. These sharecropping and credit systems create a 
“symbiotic relationship” between the landed and the land-poor (p.105). Although in the long 
term these processes have fuelled processes of “socio-economic differentiation” and class 
formation, in the short-term struggle for survival the role that opium plays in enabling the 
poor to access land and credit remains an important advantage in the eyes of those who grow 
it. Consequently, it should hardly be surprising that the opium economy has become central 
to structures of rural patronage and a key mechanism around which power is brokered; 
especially through the role that opium plays in facilitating the purchase of land and weapons 
and by providing a means to bribe officials. 
 
Central to Mansfield‟s argument is the need for greater sensitivity to the spatial variation 
regarding how opium bans were imposed, the impact they had and the responses they evoked. 
Indeed, despite the importance of opium to rural economies, Mansfield shows that in some 
regions of Afghanistan where there are agricultural surpluses, hierarchical social structures 
and a history of state encapsulation, opium bans have proved sustainable (p.xvii). In these 
areas of “consolidated statehood”, such as irrigated regions of Helmand close to urban 
centres, bans have endured thanks to a combination of higher wheat prices, regional 
integration into national and international economies (which has made other cash crops more 
viable), better security, and increasing non-farm employment opportunities in towns, for 
which revenue accumulated from opium often provided the start-up capital allowing 
households to “graduate” out of the illicit economy (see also: Goodhand and Mansfield 2010: 
26).  
 
However, across most of Helmand and Nangahar opium bans inflicted great hardship on a 
peasant population with “strong communal traditions” and a history of challenging state 
authority, and as a result proved unsustainable. In these areas of “limited statehood”, where 
there are few viable alternatives to opium production, opium bans necessitated brokerage 
agreements between the provincial governor and a fractured local rural elite whose authority 
was constantly challenged by disgruntled rural populations. Imposing opium bans required a 
significant expenditure of political capital from provincial and local elites, whose ability to 
deliver results remained dependent on fragile political coalitions and negotiations with local 
communities. And, as the deleterious impact of the bans took hold, these counter-narcotics 
efforts “exacted a toll”, undermining the very structures of authority that the government was 
reliant upon to extend its writ into the countryside (p.203). Thus it became “almost inevitable 
that sub-national and local leaders who had been active in supporting the ban would find 
themselves increasingly marginalised once market conditions changed, particularly when 
international priorities shifted away from counter-narcotics, the US military forces announced 
their withdrawal from the province, and the political leadership sensed reduced opportunities 
for patronage from development budgets” (p.207). 
 Most dramatically, as Mansfield shows in the penultimate chapter of the book, the opium ban 
in Helmand resulted in the spread of poppy onto former desert land north of the Boghra 
Canal. By cultivating opium, farmers have been able to cover the extra costs required to farm 
desert land (water pumps, tubewells and the fuel for the generators that power them). Opium 
has thus emerged at the forefront of new agricultural frontiers in Afghanistan, opening up 
new “political and physical” spaces for the rural poor. Stretching across more than 35,000 
hectares and with a burgeoning population of more than 160,000 “that had experienced life in 
state space and had no wish to return” (p.273), this new frontier region, which has become a 
stronghold for the Taliban, epitomises the failure of state-building, counter-insurgency and 
counter-narcotics programmes in Afghanistan.  
 
Whereas the international community initially lauded the various opium bans implemented 
under the Karzai administration as proof of the success of its state-building mission, 
Mansfield‟s work clearly shows that for many on the ground the bans merely created 
“patterns of collective insecurity” (Scott 1976: 205), which folded into a wider narrative of 
the state‟s failure to improve the lives of its people and the country‟s loss of sovereignty. As 
Mansfield concludes, there is thus a paradox in efforts to reduce drug production in supply 
countries: “a sustainable shift out of drug cultivation requires a reasonably high-capacity, 
legitimate and developmental state; yet…prohibition can undermine the possibility of the 
emergence of such a state” (p.285). 
 
Mansfield‟s book is a hugely valuable addition to our understanding both of what went wrong 
in Afghanistan and of the failures of the current drug control regime.  It provides a powerful 
corrective to prevailing policy narratives that assume state-building, peacebuilding and 
counter-narcotics interventions are necessarily mutually reinforcing, and instead reveals the 
complex policy trade-offs that surround interventions in drug-affected environments. In doing 
so the book provides a further powerful voice on the importance of agrarian political 
economy to the study of violent conflict, peacebuilding and state-building.  
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